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Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040024-7

31 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: General Taylor's Views re a Mechanism to Provide
Early Warning of Cold War Critical Situations**

1. Sheldon, Parrott, and I met with General Taylor this morning.
2. General Taylor reasserted his belief that such a mechanism was desirable, but thought a final decision to proceed should come only after you had talked the matter out with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and presumably himself representing the White House -- and after the President and the two secretaries had agreed that it would be useful.
3. He summarized the sense of our meeting about as follows:
 - a. The mechanism to flag such situations would involve reordering, systemizing, and making more formal the present USIB sensitive situations agenda item.

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- b. The mechanism could be roughly parallel to the Watch mechanism and would produce a companion piece to the Weekly Watch Report -- namely a coordinated report, discussed and approved by USIB.
- c. The mechanism would employ as many of the presently existing USIB institutions as necessary, e.g., the current intelligence and Watch organizations of the USIB agencies, the Critic system, etc. It would need only a few extra people. It would not necessarily require its own indications center; it would not require a Cold War war room. But it would have to have enough permanent operating structure so as to be able to handle urgent new developments on a crash basis.
- d. As to form and format of the report, he would leave this to USIB. He discussed our proposal and seemed to approve of it in principle. He felt quite strongly however that the essential characteristic of the end product would have to be the care with which really critical situations were selected. He indicated

- 2 -

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
that a system which would duplicate world wide current reporting or one which pointed a warning finger in all directions would not be effective.

e. I recommend that you get USIB to go along with the idea of an ad hoc committee to report next week on how we organize the task, what we do and what the end product will look like.

f. I also recommend that you bring up the desirability of moving the USIB meeting to Thursday.

BERNARD KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

31 July 1961

*in
Spades*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: General Taylor's Views re a Mechanism to Provide
Early Warning of Cold War Critical Situations*

1. General Taylor reasserted his belief that such a mechanism was desirable, but thought a final decision to proceed should come only after you had talked the matter out with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and presumably himself representing the White House -- and after the President and the two secretaries had agreed that it would be useful.
2. At the end of our discussion he summarized the sense of the meeting about as follows:
 - a. The mechanism to flag such situations would involve reordering, systemizing, and making more formal the present USIB sensitive situations agenda item.

*Mr. Sheldon and I met with General Taylor and Thomas Parrott of his staff for about 40 minutes this morning.

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b. The mechanism could be roughly parallel to the Watch mechanism and would produce a companion piece to the Weekly Watch Report -- namely a coordinated written report, discussed and approved by USIB. ✓

c. The mechanism would employ as many of the presently existing USIB institutions as necessary, e.g., the current intelligence and Watch organizations of the USIB agencies, the Critic system, etc. It would need only a few extra people. It would not necessarily require its own indications center; it would not require a Cold War war room. But it would have to have enough permanent operating structure so as to be able to handle urgent new developments on a crash basis. ✓

d. As to details of the form and format of the report, he would leave this to USIB. He felt, however, (1) that it should take note of existing or foreseeable Cold War crisis situations already identified as such, (2) that it should flag significant changes in such situations, ✓

- 2 -

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and finally, (3) it should identify, as early as possible, any new or newly foreseeable situation which could develop into a Cold War crisis.

e. The above might be construed as a call for extended coverage. General Taylor, however, was explicit in emphasizing that economy of treatment was the heart of the problem. He further stressed that the items in the end-produce would have to be selected with extreme care so that only really critical situations were treated. He indicated that a system which would duplicate world wide current reporting or one which pointed a warning finger in all directions would not be effective.

f. I recommend that the USIB appoint an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Montague to report next week on (1) how we organize the task; (2) on the best procedures for drafting, coordinating, and securing USIB approval; (3) on what kind of situations are to be included (recognizing that defining the final criteria in this respect will require a period of trial and error); and (4) on what the end-product will look like.

- 3 -

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g. I also recommend that you bring up the desirability of moving the USIB meeting to Thursday.



SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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- 4 -

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